

SAT and SMT Solving

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SS 2018

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- Summary of Last Week
- Bounded Model Checking for Verification

Summary of Last Week

Definitions

- ▶ **theory** consists of
 - ▶ signature Σ : set of function and predicate symbols
 - ▶ axioms T : set of sentences in first-order logic in which only function and predicate symbols of Σ appear
- ▶ theory is **stably infinite** if every satisfiable quantifier-free formula has model with infinite carrier set
- ▶ theory T is **convex** if $F \models_T \bigvee_{i=1}^n u_i = v_i$ implies $F \models_T u_i = v_i$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ \forall quantifier-free conjunction F and variables u_i, v_i

Definition

theory combination $T_1 \oplus T_2$ of two theories

- ▶ T_1 over signature Σ_1
- ▶ T_2 over signature Σ_2

has signature $\Sigma_1 \cup \Sigma_2$ and axioms $T_1 \cup T_2$

Nelson-Oppen Method: Nondeterministic Version

Input quantifier-free conjunction φ in theory combination $T_1 \oplus T_2$

Output satisfiable or unsatisfiable

1 purification

$\varphi \approx \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ for Σ_1 -formula φ_1 and Σ_2 -formula φ_2

2 guess and check

- ▶ V is set of shared variables in φ_1 and φ_2
- ▶ guess equivalence relation E on V
- ▶ arrangement $\alpha(V, E)$ is formula

$$\bigwedge_{x E y} x = y \quad \wedge \quad \bigwedge_{\neg(x E y)} x \neq y$$

- ▶ if $\varphi_1 \wedge \alpha(V, E)$ is T_1 -satisfiable and $\varphi_2 \wedge \alpha(V, E)$ is T_2 -satisfiable then return **satisfiable** else return **unsatisfiable**

Nelson-Oppen Method: Deterministic Version

Input quantifier-free conjunction φ in combination $T_1 \oplus T_2$
 of convex theories T_1 and T_2

Output satisfiable or unsatisfiable

- 1 **purification** $\varphi \approx \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ for Σ_1 -formula φ_1 and Σ_2 -formula φ_2
- 2 **V**: set of shared variables in φ_1 and φ_2
 E: already discovered equalities between variables in V
- 3 test satisfiability of $\varphi_1 \wedge E$ (and add implied equations)
 - ▶ if $\varphi_1 \wedge E$ is **T_1 -unsatisfiable** then return unsatisfiable
 - ▶ else **add** new implied equalities to E
- 4 test satisfiability of $\varphi_2 \wedge E$ (and add implied equations)
 - ▶ if $\varphi_2 \wedge E$ is **T_2 -unsatisfiable** then return unsatisfiable
 - ▶ else **add** new implied equalities to E
- 5 if E has been extended in steps 3 or 4 then go to step 2
 else return satisfiable

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Bounded Model Checking for Verification

Ariane 5 Flight 501 (1996)

- ▶ destroyed 37 seconds after launch
- ▶ software for Ariane 4 for was reused
- ▶ software error: data conversion from 64-bit floating point to 16-bit integer caused arithmetic overflow
- ▶ cost: 370 million \$

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ariane_5_Flight_501



Mars Exploration Rover “Spirit” (2004)

- ▶ landed on January 4
- ▶ stopped communicating on January 21
- ▶ software error: stuck in reboot loop
- ▶ reboot failed because of flash memory failure, ultimate problem: too many files

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Heathrow Terminal 5 Opening (2008)

- ▶ baggage system collapsed on opening day
- ▶ 42,000 bags not shipped with their owners, 500 flights cancelled
- ▶ software was tested but did not work properly with real-world load
- ▶ cost 50 million £

<http://www.zdnet.com/article/it-failure-at-heathrow-t5-what-really-happened>



Trading Glitch at Knight Capital (2012)

- ▶ bug in trading software resulted in 45 minutes of uncontrolled buys
- ▶ company did 11% of US trading that year
- ▶ software was run in invalid configuration
- ▶ 440 million \$ lost

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Death in Self-Driving Car Crash (2018)

- ▶ person died in accident with Uber's self-driving car
- ▶ victim was wrongly classified by software as non-obstacle

<http://www.siliconrepublic.com/companies/uber-bug-crash>



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transport, energy, medicine, communication, finance, embedded systems, . . .

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How to Ensure Correctness of Software?

▶ testing

- + cheap, simple
- checks desired result only for given set of testcases

▶ verification

- + can prove automatically that system meets specification, i.e., desired output is delivered for all inputs
- more costly

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Model Checking

- ▶ widely used verification approach to
 - ▶ find bugs in software and hardware
 - ▶ prove correctness of models

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
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
Model Checking

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- ▶ Turing Award 2007 for Clarke, Emerson, and Sifakis
- ▶ **bounded** model checking can be reduced to SAT/SMT


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Model Checking Example: Mutex (1)

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
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while (other process critical) :
    wait ()
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
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- ▶ process can be abstracted to model $\mathcal{M} = \langle S, R \rangle$ with states $S = \{n, w, c\}$ and transitions R :




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
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- live:** whenever any process wants to enter its critical section, it will eventually be permitted to do so
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
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temporal logic

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- ▶ but state space is **very** large: $(2^{32})^2 \cdot 7$ for bit width 32
- ▶ cannot check all possible values


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
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
- ▶ construct program graph G
- ▶ $\{1, \dots, 7\}$ are possible values of program counter (line numbers)



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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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3 if φ_k satisfiable then overflow can occur within k steps ... ask Z3 ✨



Bounded Model Checking

- ▶ find counterexamples to desired property of transition system (bugs)
- ▶ counterexamples are **bounded** in size

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
Remark

S and A may be (countably) infinite

Bounded Model Checking: Safety Properties

Idea


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
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
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
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
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SAT/SMT Encoding

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$$I(\langle s_0 \rangle) \wedge \bigwedge_{i=0}^{k-1} T(\langle s_i \rangle, \langle s_{i+1} \rangle) \wedge \bigvee_{i=0}^k \left(P(\langle s_i \rangle) \wedge \bigwedge_{j=i}^k \neg C(\langle s_j \rangle) \wedge \bigvee_{l=i}^k T(\langle s_k \rangle, \langle s_l \rangle) \right)$$

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- ▶ program graph is useful to derive encoding of $\mathcal{T}(P)$


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4     for(i=0; i<=n; i++) {  
5         if (i<j)  
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
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
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
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- ▶ see `verification.py`



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- ▶ explicit assertions



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