Computation of Market Equilibria by Convex Programming

Game Theory & Planning



- Model Definition
- Solving the Fisher Model
- Solving Exchange Economies
- Potential Application

### **Motivation**

3

- Markets dominate our economic world
   In many cases stable price are established
   win-win situation for (all) participants
- Today's goal: present models for markets
   Define stable conditions (equilibria)
  - Define algorithms to compute those
  - Ultimately: use models to cope with similar problems



# The Model (1)

### □ A market *M* is given by

- n goods and
- m economic agents / traders
  - each trader i has a concave utility function

$$u_i: \mathbb{R}^n_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$$

and an initial endowment

$$w_i = (w_{i1}, \dots, w_{in}) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$$

# The Model (2)

At given prizes

$$\pi = (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$$

- trader *i* will sell her endowment  $w_i$ , and get the bundle of goods

$$x_i = (x_{i1}, \dots, x_{in}) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$$

- maximizing  $u_i(x)$  subject to the *budget* constrain

$$\pi \cdot x_i \le \pi \cdot w_i$$

# Market Equilibrium


7

- □ An equilibrium is a vector of prices  $\pi = (\pi_1, ..., \pi_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ such that:
  - for each trader *i*, there is a bundle  $\bar{x}_i = (\bar{x}_i, ..., \bar{x}_i)$  of goods
  - the vector  $\bar{x}_i$  is maximizing  $u_i(x)$  subject to the constrains  $\pi \cdot x_i \leq \pi \cdot w_i$  and  $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$

• for each good j,  $\sum_i \bar{x}_{ij} \leq \sum_i w_{ij}$ 

Arrow and Debreu('54): such an equilibrium exists
 Problem: how to computing such equilibria?

# Utility Functions (1)



non-satiable:  $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ .  $\exists y \in \mathbb{R}^n_+$ : u(y) > u(x)monoton:  $y \ge x \Rightarrow u(y) \ge u(x)$ 

□ Frequent assumption
□ homogeneous  $\forall x, \alpha > 0 : u(\alpha x) = \alpha u(x)$ 

# Utility Functions (2)

9

- □ Popular examples of homogeneous utility functions:
   □ Linear utility function: u<sub>i</sub>(x) = ∑<sub>j</sub> a<sub>ij</sub>x<sub>ij</sub>
   □ Cobb-Douglas function: u<sub>i</sub>(x) = ∏<sub>i</sub>(x<sub>ij</sub>)<sup>a<sub>ij</sub></sup>, (∑<sub>i</sub> a<sub>ij</sub> = 1)
  - Leontief (fixed-proportion) function:  $u_i(x) = \min_i a_{ij} x_{ij}$
- General, constant elasticity of substitution form (CES)

$$u_i(x) = \left(\sum_j (a_{ij} x_{ij})^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

where  $-\infty < \rho < 1$ ,  $\rho \neq 0$ 



### **The Fisher Model**

Market consisting of
 n goods sold by <u>one</u> seller
 total of q<sub>j</sub> > 0 of good j available

m utility maximizing buyers

- concave utility function  $u_i: \mathbb{R}^n_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+$
- Initial endowment  $e_i > 0$  of money

• Budget constrain:  $\pi \cdot x \leq e_i$ 

## The Fisher Model (2)

Special case of the exchange economy model
 initial endowments are proportional
  $w_i = \delta_i w, \quad \delta_i > 0$ 

If traders have *homogeneous* utility functions
 => equilibrium can be obtained by solving a convex program (Eisenberg's program)

## **Convex Programs**

13

Description of a convex optimization problem

minimize f(x)subject to  $g_i(x) \le 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, m$  $h_i(x) = 0, \quad i = 1, \dots, p$ 

- Elements:
  - A convex function  $f(x): \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R}$  (to be minimized)
  - **Inequality constraints**  $g_i(x) \le 0$ 
    - functions  $g_i$  are <u>convex</u>
  - **Equality constraints**  $h_i(x) = 0$ 
    - functions  $h_i$  are <u>affine</u>

# Convex Programs (2)

- □ Allow to …
  - Minimizing convex functions
  - Maximizing concave functions
  - test feasibility of convex/concave constraints
- There are polynomial algorithms for solving convex programs
  - Ellipsoid method (polynomial, but slow)
  - Interior-point method (polynomial, 1994)

## Eisenberg's program

15

Any optimal solution of the convex program

$$\begin{array}{ll} \underset{x}{\text{maximize}} & \sum_{i} e_{i} \log u_{i}(x_{i}) \\ \text{subject to} & \sum_{i} x_{ij} \leq q_{j} \quad \text{for each } j \end{array}$$

on nonnegative variables  $x_{ij}$  yields an allocations of goods constituting a market equilibrium.

#### Note: no prices involved!



# **Linear Utility Functions**

- □ Suppose that  $u_i(x) = \sum_j a_{ij} x_{ij}$  and  $w_{ij} > 0$  for each i,j
  - The problem of finding an equilibrium can be written as a finite convex <u>feasibility</u> problem:

Find  $\psi_i$  and nonnegative  $x_{ij}$  such that

$$\sum_{k} a_{ik} x_{ik} \ge a_{ij} \sum_{k} w_{ik} e^{\psi_k - \psi_j} \text{ for each } i, j$$
$$\sum_{i} x_i = \sum_{i} w_i$$

Any solution to this problem corresponds to an equilibrium obtained by setting  $\pi_j = e^{\psi_j}$ 

# **CES Utility Functions**


- If ρ<sub>i</sub> > 0: The Discrete Tâtonnement Process
   Iterative trial-and-error process
   delivers approximated solution in polynomial time
- If −1 ≤ ρ<sub>i</sub> < 0: convex *feasibility* problem
   *n* inequality constrains of length O(m)
- □ If  $\rho_i < -1$  for some trader *i*, the set of equilibria is no longer convex
  - can be reduced to computing a Nash equilibrium for twoplayer nonzero sum games
  - => solving Leontief exchange economies is PPAD hard



### **Resource Allocation**

20

### The Insieme Runtime:



Resources HW Threads, Memory, GPU Time <u>Control Flows</u> independent, parallel regions

## **Example Economic Model**

- Based on the Fisher Model:
  - **g**oods:
    - Each CPU is a kind of good (hardware threads)
    - The shared memory of each computer
    - Each GPU is a good (time shared)
  - buyers: the parallel regions + one idle process
    - Each region defines its own utility function
    - Each region has an initial endowment (money)
      - Can be used to prioritize the execution of some regions

# **Problem: Utility Functions**

- Linear utility functions
  - would make memory and CPUs exchangeable (!)
- Cobb-Douglas functions
   same amount of money for each good?
- Leontief (fix-proportion) function
  - Good for product mix
  - Problem of choosing between options ...

### **Solution**

### Sum of convex functions is convex!

+ preserves all other utility function constraints

- Utility function:
  - For each node ...
    - => define one fixed-proportion utility function
  - Linear combination of those functions constitutes an adequate utility function!

### Conclusion

- Covered Models for Economies
  - Fisher Model
  - Exchange economies

Definition of Equilibria
 + Overview on means for computing those
 + Complexity and Limitations

A potential application within the Insieme project

