

# Game Theory and Planning (PhD seminar)

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### Topics

- Learning, regret minimisation and equilibria
- Computation of market equilibria by convex programming
- Graphical games
- Mechanism design
- Combinatorial auctions
- Routing games
- Load balancing or job allocation schemes
- Price of anarchy and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms
- Cascading behaviour in networks: algorithmic and economic issues
- Sponsored search auctions

### Schedule

lectures	seminar talks
October 6 (GM) October 13 (RP) October 20 (GM) November 3 (RP)	January 14 January 15

### Seminar Talk

the seminar talks should present the main results obtained with respect to the language studied

### Seminar Report

a short, but detailed overview of the material covered in the talk has to be handed in (maximum 5 pages); deadline February 20, 2011

#### Overview

(Algorithmic) game theory is conceivable as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent and rational decision-makers.


Today many applications of computer science involve autonomous decision-makers with conflicting objectives.

One application domain were computer science profits from game theoretic knowledge is networks in general and scheduling in particular.

### Games in Extensive Form


### Example

- player 1 and 2 put 1€ in a pot
- player 1 draws a card, which is either red or black
- player 1 looks at this card in private and can either raise or pass
- if player 1 passes, then she shows the card
  - if the card is red, then player 1 wins the pot
  - if the card is black, then player 2 wins the pot
- if player 1 raises, she adds another euro
- player 2 can meet or fold
  - if player 2 folds the game ends and player 1 wins the pot
  - if player 2 meets she has to add  $1 \in$
- the games continues as above



### Definition

- node 0 is a chance node
- nodes 1,2 are decision nodes
- the path representing the actual events is called path of play



### Definition

each decision nodes has two labels

**1** the player label

2 the information label

#### Requirement

the set of move-labels following two nodes must be the same if the two nodes are controlled by the same player in the same information state

### n-Person Extensive-Form Game

### Definition

an *n*-person extensive-form game  $\Gamma^e$  is a labelled tree, where also edges are labelled such that

- 1 each nonterminal node has player label in  $\{0, 1, ..., n\}$ nodes labelled with 0 are called chance nodes nodes labelled within  $\{1, ..., n\}$  are called decision nodes
- **2** edges leaving chance nodes (also called alternatives) are labelled with probabilities that sum up to 1
- g player nodes have a second label, the information label reflecting the information state
- 4 each alternative at a player node has a move label
- **5** each terminal node is labelled with  $(u_1, \ldots, u_n)$ , the payoff

### Definition (cont'd)

- **6**  $\forall$  player *i*,
  - $\forall$  nodes x y z controlled by *i*,
  - $\forall$  alternatives b at x
    - suppose y and z have the same information state y follows x and b
    - ∃ node w, ∃ alternative c at w such that z follows w and c
    - and w is controlled by player i
      w has the same information label as x
      c has the same move label as b


#### Question

what does the last condition mean?

#### Answer

it asserts perfect recall: whenever a player moves, she remembers all the information she knew earlier

## No Perfect Recall



## Perfect Information Games Definition

if no two nodes have the same information state, we say the game has perfect information

### Definition


- S<sub>i</sub> is the set of information states per player i
- $D_s$  is the set of possible moves at  $s \in S_i$
- the set of strategies for player *i* is

$$\prod_{s \in S_i} D_s = \underbrace{D_s \times D_s \times \cdots \times D_s}_{S_i \text{-times}}$$

### Example

the set of strategies for player 1:  $\{Rr, Rp, Pr, Pp\}$ 


## Influencing Your Opponent



T (2,2) (2,2) (2,2) (1.1) (1.0) (2.3) (1.0) (1.0) (2.3) (1.0)(3,1)

Observation player 1 profits more, if she chooses T player 2 doesn't know player 1's choice Observation player 1 profits more, if she chooses B

player 2 does know player 1's choice



## Strategic-Form Games

### Definition

a strategic-form game is a tuple  $\Gamma = (N, (C_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$  such that

**1** *N* is the set of players

**2** for each *i*:  $C_i$  is the set of strategies of player *i* 

**3** for each *i*:  $u_i$ :  $\prod_{i \in N} C_i \to \mathbb{R}$  is the expected utility payoff

a strategic-form game is finite if N and each  $C_i$  is finite

### Example

consider the card game, suppose player 1 plans to use strategy Rp and player 2 plans to use M

$$u_1(Rp, M) = 2 \cdot \frac{1}{2} + -1 \cdot \frac{1}{2} = 0.5$$
  
 $u_2(Rp, M) = -2 \cdot \frac{1}{2} + 1 \cdot \frac{1}{2} = -0.5$ 

### Definition

given a game  $\Gamma^e$  in extensive form, we define the normal representation as strategic-form game  $\Gamma = (N, (C_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$ :


- **1**  $N = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ , if  $\Gamma^e$  is an *n*-person game
- **2** for each *i*:  $C_i$  denotes the strategies of each player as defined above

**3** we define the expected utility payoff  $u_i$ 

• set 
$$C = \prod_{i \in N} C_i$$


- let x be a node in  $\Gamma^e$
- let  $c \in C$  denote a given strategy profile
- let P(x|c) denotes the probability that the path of play goes through x, if c is chosen
- let  $\Omega^*$  denote the set of all terminal nodes
- for  $x \in \Omega^*$ ,  $w_i(x)$  denotes the payoff for player i

$$u_i(c) = \sum_{x \in \Omega^*} P(x|c)w_i(x)$$



### Definition

the normal represent	ation	<i>C</i> <sub>2</sub>	
	$C_1$	М	F
	Rr	0,0	1, -1
	Rр	0.5, -0.5	0,0
	Pr	-0.5, 0.5	1,-1
	Pр	0,0	0,0



## (Fully) Reduced Normal Representation

#### Definition

let  $\Gamma = (N, (C_i)_{i \in N}, (u_i)_{i \in N})$ , we say  $d_i$  and  $e_i$  in  $C_i$ , are payoff equivalent if

 $u_j(c_{-i}, d_i) = u_j(c_{-i}, e_i)$  for all  $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}, j \in N$ 

### Example

strategies  $a_1x_1$ ,  $a_1y_1$ ,  $a_1z_1$  are payoff equivalent

#### Definition

identifying payoff equivalent strategies yields the purely reduced normal representation

## Example

	$C_2$		
$C_1$	<i>x</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>y</i> <sub>2</sub>	
$a_1\cdot$	6,0	6,0	
$b_1x_1$	8,0	0,8	
$b_1y_1$	0,8	8,0	
$b_1 z_1$	3,4	7,0	

### Example

consider the following game

	$C_2$			
$C_1$	<i>x</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>y</i> <sub>2</sub>	<i>z</i> <sub>2</sub>	
$x_1$	3,0	0,2	0,3	
$y_1$	2,0	1,1	2,0	
<i>z</i> <sub>1</sub>	0,3	0,2	3,0	

the unique Nash equilibrium is  $(y_1, y_2)$  as it is the best-response to all other strategies