

1. Consider the following propositional formulas

$$A := (p \rightarrow q) \wedge (q \rightarrow \neg p) \rightarrow p$$
$$B := (p \wedge q \rightarrow r) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r))$$

- a) Show that formula A is satisfiable by giving a satisfying assignment. (4 pts)
b) Show that formula B is valid, by giving a proof in propositional resolution. (6 pts)

2. Consider the following sentences:

- ① A dragon is happy if its mother or its father is happy.
- ② A dragon can spit fire, if one of its ancestors can spit fire.
- ③ The mother or the father of a dragon are ancestors.
- ④ An ancestor of an ancestor is an ancestor.
- ⑤ There exists a blue dragon that cannot spit fire.

- a) For each of the sentences above, give a first-order formula that formalises the sentence. Use therefore *only* the following constants, functions and predicates:
- constants: **blue**, **red**
 - functions: **colour**(x)
 - predicates: **Dragon**(x), **Happy**(x), **Spitfire**(x), **Father**(x, y), **Mother**(x, y), **Ancestor**(x, y), =

Note that the predicates **Father**(x, y), **Mother**(x, y), **Ancestor**(x, y) are to be interpreted as y is father of x , y is mother of x , y is ancestor of x , respectively.

- b) Show that your formalisation is satisfiable.

3. Consider first-order logic *without* equality. Let $\mathcal{I} = (\mathcal{A}, \ell)$ be an interpretation and F a formula. Suppose we restrict the logical symbols in any first-order language to \neg , \wedge , and \exists . Moreover, suppose that we do not distinguish (in the notation) between free and bound variables. Then we attempt to define the satisfaction relation $\mathcal{I} \models F$ as follows:

- $\mathcal{I} \models P(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ iff $(t_1^{\mathcal{I}}, \dots, t_n^{\mathcal{I}}) \in P^{\mathcal{I}}$
- $\mathcal{I} \models \neg F$ iff $\mathcal{I} \not\models F$.
- $\mathcal{I} \models F \wedge G$ iff $\mathcal{I} \models F$ and $\mathcal{I} \models G$.
- $\mathcal{I} \models \exists x F(x)$ iff there exists $a \in A$ (A the domain of \mathcal{A}) and $\mathcal{I}\{x \mapsto a\} \models F(x)$ holds.

- a) Is this definition correct? Explain your answer. (4 pts)
b) Regardless of the correctness of the definition, the definition is incomplete for the language of first-order logic without equality as defined in the lecture. Explain why. (3 pts)

- c) Explain how this definition can be made complete (not necessarily correct). (3 pts)
4. Consider the following first-order formulas (with $=$) with individual constants \mathbf{a} , \mathbf{b} , and predicate constants \mathbf{P} , \mathbf{Q} , and \mathbf{R} :

$$C := \exists x \forall y \exists z \forall u \exists v (\mathbf{P}(x) \vee \neg \mathbf{Q}(y, z) \vee \mathbf{R}(u, v))$$

$$D := \forall x (\mathbf{P}(x) \rightarrow \exists y \forall z (\mathbf{P}(z) \vee \mathbf{Q}(x, y) \rightarrow \forall w \mathbf{R}(x, w)))$$

$$E := \mathbf{a} = \mathbf{b} \wedge \exists x \mathbf{Q}(\mathbf{a}, x) \rightarrow \exists x \mathbf{Q}(\mathbf{b}, x)$$

- a) Give the SNF of formula C . (3 pts)
- b) Give the SNF of formula D . (3 pts)
- a) Use paramodulation for first-order to show that formula E is valid. (6 pts)
5. Determine whether the statements on the answer sheet are true or false. Every correct answer is worth 1 points (and every wrong -1 points). (10 pts)
- Consider propositional logic. Then $A_1, \dots, A_n \models B$, asserts that $\mathbf{v}(B) = \mathbf{T}$, whenever there exists $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\mathbf{v}(A_i) = \mathbf{T}$, for any assignment \mathbf{v} .
 - Natural deduction for propositional logic is sound and complete.
 - Let \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} be first-order structures such that $\mathcal{A} \cong \mathcal{B}$ and let ℓ be an environment. Then for every formula F we have $(\mathcal{A}, \ell) \models F$ iff $(\mathcal{B}, \ell) \models F$.
 - If formula G is obtained from formula F on replacing a subformulas A by an equivalent formula B then F and G are equivalent.
 - For any formula F there exists a formula G such that G does neither contain individual or function constants nor equality and $F \approx G$.
 - The set S of all consistent set of formulas has the satisfaction properties.
 - Let \mathcal{G} be a countable set of formulas, if \mathcal{G} is consistent, then \mathcal{G} has only uncountable models.
 - For directed graphs, reachability is expressible as existential, first-order formula.
 - There exists no satisfiable set of first-order sentences \mathcal{G} , such that there exists no Herbrand model of \mathcal{G} .
 - For any first-order sentence F there exists a set of clauses $\mathcal{C} = \{C_1, \dots, C_m\}$ such that $F \approx \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n (C_1 \wedge \dots \wedge C_m)$.