

1. *Solution.* Let $H(v_1)$ express the set P^* and let $H'(v_1)$ be the predicate according to the assumption. Furthermore we write $\ulcorner E \urcorner$ for the Gödel number of E . We observe the following:
 - $H(\bar{n})$ holds iff $n \in P^*$.
 - $H'(\bar{n})$ is provable iff $H(\bar{n})$ is refutable.
 - If $h' := \ulcorner H'(v_1) \urcorner$, then $H(h')$ holds iff $H(h')$ is refutable.

Now, suppose $H(h')$ is provable, thus $H(h')$ holds by correctness and then $H(h')$ is refutable, which is a contradiction. Similarly, if $H(h')$ is refutable, then $H(h')$ holds, which contradicts correctness. Hence \mathcal{L} is incomplete. \square

2. *Solution.* It is easy to see that the assumptions imply that \mathcal{L} is consistent. Hence, we only give the proof of b). Suppose $F(v_1)$ represents A and $f := \ulcorner F(v_1) \urcorner$. Then we have
 - $F(f)$ is provable iff $f \in A$.
 - $F(f)$ is provable iff $f \in P^*$.

Hence we obtain $f \in P^*$ iff $f \in A$. Thus $f \notin A$ and $f \notin P^*$. From this observation it follows that $F(f)$ is neither provable, nor refutable. \square

3. *Solution.* See §3 in Chapter 2 of Smullyan's book. \square
4. *Solution.* By assumption, there exists Σ_0 -formulas $S_0(v_1, v_2, v_3)$ and $S_1(v_1, v_2, v_3)$ such that we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} R(m, n) \text{ holds} &\leftrightarrow \exists z S_0(\bar{m}, \bar{n}, z) \\ R(m, n) \text{ does not hold} &\leftrightarrow \exists z S_1(\bar{m}, \bar{n}, z) \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, there exists a formula $G(v_1, v_2, v_3)$ such that $f(m) = y$ iff $\exists z G(\bar{m}, \bar{n}, z)$. We show that $Q(x)$ is Σ_1 and that $\sim Q(x)$ is Σ_1 as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Q(m) \text{ holds} &\leftrightarrow \exists z \exists v \exists w (G(\bar{m}, z, v) \wedge (\exists y \leq z) S_0(\bar{m}, y, w)) \\ Q(m) \text{ does not hold} &\leftrightarrow \exists z \exists v \exists w (G(\bar{m}, z, v) \wedge (\forall y \leq z) (\exists u \leq w) S_1(\bar{m}, y, u)) \end{aligned}$$

Note that for the second formula the existential quantifier bounding w in $S_1(\bar{m}, y, u)$ cannot be directly move in front of the bounded quantifier $(\forall y \leq z)$. Hence the need for this seemingly artificial bounded quantifier $(\exists u \leq w)$, cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 in Smullyan's book.

Clearly the formulas to the right are equivalent to Σ_1 -sentences. Hence the claim follows. \square

5.

Solution.

statement	yes	no
Let \mathcal{S} be any extension of PA. If \mathcal{S} is consistent, then \mathcal{S} is incomplete.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
if \mathcal{L} is correct and if $(\sim P)^*$ is expressible in \mathcal{L} , then \mathcal{L} is complete.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
The set T of Gödel numbers of the true arithmetic sentences is arithmetic.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
The relation $x^y = z$ is Σ_0 .	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
All true Σ_0 -sentences of Robinson's Q are provable in PA.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Suppose the system \mathcal{S} is consistent and all true Σ_0 -sentences are provable. This does not imply that all provable Σ_0 -sentences are true.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Suppose $F(v_1)$ separates A from B in \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{S} is consistent, then $F(v_1)$ represents some superset of A disjoint from B .	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Every extension \mathcal{S} of Ω_4, Ω_5 in which all Σ_1 -relations are enumerable is a Rosser system.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rosser's theorem states that every ω -consistent extension of Ω_4, Ω_5 in which all Σ_1 -sets are enumerable must be incomplete.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Suppose PA is consistent. Then consistency of PA is not provable in any extension of PA.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

□