

Homework

- Chapter V, Exercise 9
- Chapter V, Exercise 10
- Chapter V, Exercise 11
- Chapter V, Exercise 12
- Chapter VI, Exercise 3 (postpone)
- Chapter VI, Exercise 4 (postpone)

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

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Summary of Last Lecture

GM (Institute of Computer Science @ UIBK)

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

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Definition (Q)

$$N_1: v_1' = v_2' \rightarrow v_1 = v_2$$

$$N_2: \bar{0} \neq v_1'$$

$$N_3: (v_1 + \bar{0}) = v_1$$

$$N_4: (v_1 + v_2') = (v_1 + v_2)'$$

$$N_5: (v_1 \cdot \bar{0}) = \bar{0}$$

$$N_6: (v_1 \cdot v_2') = ((v_1 \cdot v_2) + v_1)$$

$$N_7: (v_1 \leq \bar{0}) \leftrightarrow (v_1 = \bar{0})$$

$$N_8: (v_1 \leq v_2') \leftrightarrow (v_1 \leq v_2 \vee v_1 = v_2')$$

$$N_9: (v_1 \leq v_2) \vee (v_2 \leq v_1)$$

let Q_0 be Q without the axiom N_9

Definition (R)

$$\Omega_1: \bar{m} + \bar{n} = \bar{k} \text{ if } m + n = k$$

$$\Omega_2: \bar{m} \cdot \bar{n} = \bar{k} \text{ if } m \cdot n = k$$

$$\Omega_3: \bar{m} \neq \bar{n} \text{ if } m \neq n$$

$$\Omega_4: v_1 \leq \bar{n} \leftrightarrow (v_1 = \bar{0} \vee \dots \vee v_1 = \bar{n})$$

$$\Omega_5: v_1 \leq \bar{n} \vee \bar{n} \leq v_1$$

let R_0 be R without the schema Ω_5

Outline of the Lecture

General Idea Behind Gödel's Proof

abstract forms of Gödel's, Tarski's theorems, undecidable sentences of \mathcal{L}

Tarski's Theorem for Arithmetic

the language \mathcal{L}_E , concatenation and Gödel numbering, Tarski's theorem, the axiom system PE, arithmetisation of the axiom system, arithmetic without exponentiation, incompleteness of PA, Σ_1 -relations

Gödel's Proof

ω -consistency, a basic incompleteness theorem, ω -consistency lemma, Σ_0 -complete subsystems, ω -incompleteness of PA

Rosser Systems

abstract incompleteness theorems after Rosser, general separation principle, Rosser's undecidable sentence, Gödel and Rosser sentences compared, more on separation

Lemma

R_0 is Σ_0 -complete

Proof.

it suffices to show the following properties:

D_1 \forall true atomic Σ_0 -sentence A , A is provable

D_2 $\forall m, n: m \neq n: \mathcal{S} \vdash \bar{m} \neq \bar{n}$

D_3 \forall variable w , $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\mathcal{S} \vdash w \leq \bar{n} \rightarrow (w = \bar{0} \vee \dots \vee w = \bar{n})$$

we consider the three properties:

- proof of D_1 on the whiteboard
- D_2 follows from axiom schemata Ω_3
- D_3 follows from axiom schemata Ω_4

Lemma

R_0 is a subsystem of Q_0

Proof.

we need to show that Q_0 can prove the following schemata:

$$\Omega_1 \quad \bar{m} + \bar{n} = \bar{k}, \text{ if } m + n = k$$

$$\Omega_2 \quad \bar{m} \cdot \bar{n} = \bar{k}, \text{ if } m \cdot n = k$$

$$\Omega_3 \quad \bar{m} \neq \bar{n}, \text{ if } m \neq n$$

$$\Omega_4 \quad v_1 \leq \bar{n} \leftrightarrow (v_1 = \bar{0} \vee \dots \vee v_1 = \bar{n})$$

on the whiteboard

Corollary

R is a subsystem of Q

Σ_0 -completeness of PA

Theorem

the systems R_0 , R , Q_0 , Q , and PA are Σ_0 -complete

Definition

a system \mathcal{S} is Σ_0 -complete if all true Σ_0 -sentences are provable in \mathcal{S}

Recall Theorem ②

all true Σ_0 -sentences (of PA) are provable in PA

thus finally, we have proved:

Theorem

if PA is ω -consistent, then it is incomplete

Midterm Quiz

- a sentence S is **decidable** in \mathcal{S} if it either provable or refutable
- \mathcal{S} is **complete** if \forall sentences S , S is decidable; otherwise \mathcal{S} is **incomplete**

consider the following

Definition

let \mathcal{S} be an arbitrary axiom system (aka theory) and S a sentence

- we write $\mathcal{S} \models S$ if for all interpretation \mathcal{I} that model \mathcal{S} , we have $\mathcal{I} \models S$
- \mathcal{S} is **Complete** if \forall sentences S , we have $\mathcal{S} \models S$ or $\mathcal{S} \not\models S$; otherwise \mathcal{S} is **Incomplete**

Question

Is the following correct? “if PA is ω -consistent, then it is Incomplete”

ω -Incompleteness

Corollary

if \mathcal{S} is consistent, then Gödel's sentence G is not provable in \mathcal{S} , but true

Definition

a system \mathcal{S} is **ω -incomplete**, if \exists formula $F(v_1)$, such that

$$\mathcal{S} \vdash F(\bar{0}), \dots \mathcal{S} \vdash F(\bar{n}), \dots$$

yet $\mathcal{S} \not\vdash \forall v_1 F(v_1)$

Theorem

if \mathcal{S} is a consistent axiomatisable system in which all Σ_0 -sentences are provable, then \mathcal{S} is ω -incomplete

Lemma

suppose:

- 1 \mathcal{S} is consistent
- 2 all true Σ_0 -sentences are provable

then all provable Σ_0 -sentences are true; in particular this holds for PA

Proof.

by definition of consistency ■

Lemma

suppose:

- 1 \mathcal{S} is consistent and all true Σ_0 -sentences are provable
- 2 \mathcal{S} contains a Σ_0 -formula $F(v_1, v_2)$ that enumerates P^*
- 3 let $G := \forall v_2 \neg F(\bar{f}, v_2)$, where $f := \ulcorner \forall v_2 \neg F(v_1, v_2) \urcorner$

then Gödel's sentence G is true