

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem

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Summary of Last Lecture

Lemma (Separation Lemma)

if all formulas in Ω_4, Ω_5 are provable in \mathcal{S} , then for any two relation

$$R_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) \quad R_2(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

*that are **enumerable** in \mathcal{S} , $R_1 \setminus R_2$ and $R_2 \setminus R_1$ are separable*

Theorem

every extension \mathcal{S} of Ω_4, Ω_5 which is Σ_0 -complete is a Rosser system

Corollary

the systems R, Q , and PA are Rosser systems

Homework

- Chapter VI, Exercise 6.

Outline of the Lecture

General Idea Behind Gödel's Proof

abstract forms of Gödel's, Tarski's theorems, undecidable sentences of \mathcal{L}

Tarski's Theorem for Arithmetic

the language \mathcal{L}_E , Tarski's theorem, the axiom system PE, arithmetisation of the axiom system, incompleteness of PA, Σ_1 -relations

Gödel's Proof

ω -consistency, Σ_0 -complete subsystems, ω -incompleteness of PA

Rosser Systems

general separation principle, Rosser's undecidable sentence, Gödel and Rosser sentences compared

The Unprovability of Consistency

definability and diagonalisation, the unprovability of consistency

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Rosser's Undecidable Sentence

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if S is a consistent system that extends Ω_4, Ω_5 such that P^ and R^* are enumerable in S , then S is incomplete*

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every consistent extension of Ω_4, Ω_5 in which all Σ_1 -sets are enumerable must be incomplete

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Gödel and Rosser Sentences Compared

consider PA

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- Rosser's sentence $\forall y (A(\bar{h}, y) \rightarrow (\exists z \leq y) B(\bar{h}, z))$ expresses that for any potential witness of provability, there exists a potential smaller witness of refutability

Definability and Complete Representability

Recall

$F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ **represents** R in \mathcal{S} if for all $(m_1, \dots, m_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$:

$$F(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_n) \text{ is provable in } \mathcal{S} \iff (m_1, \dots, m_n) \in R$$

we also say that $F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ represents the relation $R(x_1, \dots, x_n)$

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- 2 if $R(m_1, \dots, m_n)$ is false, then $F(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_n)$ is refutable in \mathcal{S}

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- 2 if $R(m_1, \dots, m_n)$ is false, then $F(\bar{m}_1, \dots, \bar{m}_n)$ is refutable in \mathcal{S}

$F(v_1, \dots, v_n)$ **completely represents** R in \mathcal{S} if

- 1 F represents R
- 2 $\neg F$ represents $\sim R$

Lemma

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Lemma

- 1** *If S is a Rosser system, then all recursive relations are definable in S*
- 2** *If S is a consistent Rosser system, then all recursive relations are completely representable in S*

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Proof.

- by definition $R \in \Sigma_1$ and $\sim R \in \Sigma_1$ and by assumption \exists formula $F(v_1)$ that separates R from $\sim R$
- hence F defines R

Theorem

all recursive relations are definable in Robinson's R (and also in PA)

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- $F(v_1, \dots, v_n, v_{n+1})$ **weakly defines** the function $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ in \mathcal{S} if F defines the following relation:

$$f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = x_{n+1}$$

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- $F(v_1, \dots, v_n, v_{n+1})$ **strongly defines** the function $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ in \mathcal{S} if F weakly defines f and the following condition holds:

If $f(a_1, \dots, a_n) = b$, then

$$\forall v_{n+1} F(\bar{a}_1, \dots, \bar{a}_n, v_{n+1}) \rightarrow v_{n+1} = \bar{b} \text{ is provable in } \mathcal{S}$$

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Theorem

if $f(x)$ is strongly definable in \mathcal{S} , then for any formula $G(v_1)$, there \exists a formula $H(v_1)$ such that $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, H(\bar{n}) \leftrightarrow G(\overline{f(n)})$ is provable

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for any disjoint pair (A, B) of sets, a formula $F(v_1)$ **exactly separates** A from B in \mathcal{S} , if $F(v_1)$ represents A and $\neg F(v_1)$ represents B

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Corollary

suppose $f(x)$ is strongly definable in \mathcal{S}

- 1** \forall sets A representable in \mathcal{S} , $f^{-1}(A)$ is representable in \mathcal{S}
- 2** \forall pairs (A, B) that is exactly separable in \mathcal{S} , the pair $(f^{-1}(A), f^{-1}(B))$ is exactly separable in \mathcal{S}
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Corollary

the diagonal function $d(x)$ is strongly definable in every extension of R

Proof.

recall that any function whose graph is Σ_1 , is recursive ■