

1. a) For example the assignment $v(p) = F$ and $v(q) = T$ suffices to show that A is satisfiable; the assignment $v(p) = T$ and $v(r) = T$, yields that B is not a tautology.
- b) We translate B into clause form: $\mathcal{C} = \{\neg p \vee q, p \vee q, \neg q \vee \neg q\}$. Then it suffices to apply two factoring steps and two resolution steps to derive the empty clause. Hence the formula is refutable.
- c) We show that the formula $\neg C$ is inconsistent. Transformation of $\neg C$ yields the following clause set:

$$p \quad r \quad \neg p \vee q \quad \neg r \vee s \quad \neg q \vee \neg s$$

The following resolution proof shows that formula $\neg C$ is unsatisfiable:

$$\frac{\frac{\neg p \vee q \quad p}{q} \quad \frac{\frac{\neg r \vee s \quad r}{s} \quad \neg q \vee \neg s}{\neg q}}{\square}$$

2. a) See Definition 3.9 on page 19.
 - b) Consider a language $\mathcal{L} = \{P\}$ that consists only of a unary predicate constant. For \mathcal{L} , we define two structures $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbb{N}, a_A)$ and $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbb{N}, a_B)$ over the natural numbers, where the mapping a_A interprets P as the set of all numbers, but $a_B(P) = \emptyset$. By the above definition we trivially have $\mathbf{A} \cong_1 \mathbf{B}$, but clearly $\mathbf{A} \models \forall x P(x)$, while $\mathbf{B} \not\models \forall x P(x)$.
3. a)
 - ① $\forall x (\text{Dragon}(x) \wedge \forall y (\text{Child}(y, x) \rightarrow \text{Happy}(y)) \rightarrow \text{Happy}(x))$.
 - ② $\forall x (\text{Dragon}(x) \rightarrow (\text{Fly}(x) \leftrightarrow (\exists y \text{Ancestor}(y, x) \wedge \text{Fly}(y))))$.
 - ③ $\forall x (\text{Dragon}(x) \wedge (\exists y \text{Child}(x, y) \wedge (\text{colour}(y) = \text{red})) \rightarrow (\text{colour}(x) = \text{green}))$.
 - ④ $\forall x (\text{Dragon}(x) \wedge (\text{colour}(x) = \text{green})) \rightarrow \neg \text{Spitfire}(x)$.
 - ⑤ $\exists x (\text{Dragon}(x) \wedge (\text{colour}(x) = \text{red}) \wedge \neg \text{Fly}(x))$.
 - b) We define a suitable structure $\mathbf{A} = (A, a)$ where $A = \{\text{green}, \text{red}, \text{grisu}\}$ and the mapping a is defined as follows:
 - $a(\text{green}) = \text{green}, a(\text{red}) = \text{red}$
 - $a(\text{colour}) = f: \{\text{green}, \text{red}, \text{grisu}\} \mapsto \text{red}$, that is all function symbols are mapped to the constant function that always returns red .
 - $a(\text{Dragon}) = a(\text{Happy}) = \{\text{grisu}\}$ and $a(\text{Fly}) = a(\text{Child}) = a(\text{Ancestor}) = a(\text{Spitfire}) = \emptyset$.

Let l be an arbitrary assignment and $\mathcal{M} = (\mathbf{A}, l)$. Then $\mathcal{M} \models F$ holds for each of the five sentences above and thus the formalisation is satisfiable.

4. a) The formula is unsatisfiable.
 b) In the *ordered* resolution proofs given below the most general unifier employed is written to the right of each applied inference. First we derive the clause $R(a, y)$ as follows.

$$\frac{\frac{P(x) \vee Q(x) \vee R(x, y) \quad \neg P(x)}{Q(x) \vee R(x, y)} \quad \neg Q(a)}{R(a, y)} \sigma = \{x \mapsto a\}$$

Using this deduction Π , we derive the empty clause.

$$\frac{\frac{\frac{\Pi}{R(a, y)} \quad \frac{S(a, y) \vee \neg R(a, y) \vee S(x, b)}{S(a, b) \vee \neg R(a, b)} \sigma_1 \quad \neg S(a, b) \vee \neg R(a, b)}{\neg R(a, b) \vee \neg R(a, b)} \quad \neg R(a, b)}{\square} \sigma_2$$

Here $\sigma_1 := \{x \mapsto a, y \mapsto b\}$ and $\sigma_2 := \{y \mapsto b\}$.

5.

statement	yes	no
Let $\mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2$ be interpretations such that the respective universes coincide and suppose $\mathcal{I}_1, \mathcal{I}_2$ coincide on the constants in the closed formula F . Then $\mathcal{I}_1 \models F$ iff $\mathcal{I}_2 \models F$.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Let \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} be structures and $\mathcal{A} \cong \mathcal{B}$. Then for every sentence F we have $\mathcal{A} \models F$ iff $\mathcal{B} \models F$.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
For all formulas F and all sets of formulas \mathcal{G} we have that $\mathcal{G} \models F$ iff $\text{Sat}(\mathcal{G} \cup \{\neg F\})$.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Suppose \mathcal{G} is a set of formulas and $\mathcal{G} \models F$. Then there exists a finite subset $\mathcal{G}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ such that $\mathcal{G}_0 \models F$.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Let A, B be sets such that there exists a bijection m between them. Then if \mathcal{A} is a structure with domain A , there exists a structure \mathcal{B} with domain B such that $\mathcal{A} \cong \mathcal{B}$.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If formula F has a finite model, then F has a model in the domain $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, n\}$.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
If a set of formulas \mathcal{G} has an infinite model, then \mathcal{G} has no countable infinite model.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
There exists a first-order sentence F and a set of clauses $\mathcal{C} = \{C_1, \dots, C_m\}$ such that $F \approx \forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n (C_1 \wedge \dots \wedge C_m)$ does not hold.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A second-order interpretation consists of a second-order structure \mathcal{A} and a first-order environment.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reachability in directed graphs is expressible as a second-order formula.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>